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A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have organizations
responsible for overseeing the conduct of their judges.' These organiza-
tions are authorized to receive complaints of judicial misconduct and to
make preliminary investigations.2 When these investigations reveal that
further action is merited, the conduct organizations may hold formal
hearings to determine if judges are guilty of alleged wrongdoing.3 In
the majority of jurisdictions, these post-investigative proceedings are
confidential;" both the public and press may be excluded. This Com-
ment considers whether the first amendment of the United States Con-
stitution grants a right of access to these proceedings.
Part I addresses the scope of the problem posed by the confidenti-
ality of post-investigative proceedings. It first describes one state's judi-
cial conduct organization and the confidentiality of its proceedings and
recounts a recent investigation into one of that state's supreme court
justices, an investigation that became controversial because of its confi-
dentiality.5 Part I then provides an overview of all state judicial conduct
organizations, focusing on the secrecy that surrounds their activities.
Part II canvasses the relevant case law bearing on the issue of a
first amendment right of access to disciplinary proceedings, focusing
particularly on Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,6 which recog-
nized a right of access to criminal trials and which is the only majority
opinion of the Supreme Court to hold that the first amendment grants
affirmative rights of access. This part then discusses the federal appeals
and state supreme court cases that have followed Globe and have ex-
tended the right of access beyond the context of criminal trials.
Part III considers whether the rationales articulated by the Su-
preme Court in Globe in support of a first amendment right of access to
criminal trials support a parallel right of access to state judicial disci-
plinary proceedings. Part IV presents the arguments in favor of confi-
dential proceedings and finds each insufficient to justify confidentiality.
The Comment concludes that the first amendment grants a right of
I See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
2 See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
3 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 31.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 15-25.
6 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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access to post-investigative judicial disciplinary proceedings.
I. SCOPE OF THE ISSUE
A. The Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board
The Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board was created
in 1968 with the adoption of present article V, section 24 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution.7 The Review Board is authorized to receive com-
plaints of alleged judicial wrongdoing,8 conduct preliminary investiga-
tions," order hearings,' ° and, if appropriate, make recommendations to
the state supreme court that a judge be suspended, removed, disci-
plined, or forced to retire." Proceedings before the Review Board are
closed to the public and press. Pennsylvania law declares, "All papers
filed with and proceedings before the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board shall be confidential .... ", If the Review Board decides to
recommend sanctions, the record loses its confidential character when it
and the recommendations are filed with the supreme court."3
B. The Larsen Investigation
In December of 1980, the Review Board initiated an investigation
into alleged misconduct on the part of Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Justice Rolf Larsen.' Testimony in connection with the preliminary
investigation began behind closed doors in December 1981.15 Having
concluded that the evidence warranted further action, the Review
Board commenced formal, confidential proceedings in June 1982."6
On May 5, 1983, the Review Board voted to exonerate Justice
Larsen and to seal the record permanently.' 7 Two days later the Penn-
7 PA. CONST. art. V, § 24 (originally art. V, § 18). The Review Board has nine
members: five judges, two attorneys, and two non-lawyer electors.
8 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3332(a) (Purdon 1981).
9 Id.
'0 Id. § 3332(b). The Board can also compel testimony and the production of
documents.
11 Id. § 3333(a). Grounds for punishment include misconduct in office, serious
disability, and "conduct which prejudices the proper administration of justice or brings
the judicial office into disrepute." Id. § 3331(a).
12 Id. § 3334.
18 Id.
14 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum for Summary Judgment at 10, First Amendment
Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, No. 83-0579 (E.D. Pa. filed June 17,
1983) [hereinafter cited as First Amendment Coalition Memorandum].
15 Id.
1 Id.
'17 Phila. Inquirer, May 7, 1983, at 1A, col. 1.
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sylvania Supreme Court rejected a petition filed by a dissenting mem-
ber of the Review Board who requested that the record of the proceed-
ings be made public."8 Justice Larsen participated in the decision and
voted with the majority. 9
The Philadelphia Inquirer reported on May 8 that it had obtained
a copy of the twenty-eight volume record,20 which it asserted contained
"sworn, detailed statements of political maneuvering, racial bias, favor-
itism and bitter personal conflict in and around the state's highest
court."21 Responding to the decisions to seal the record,2 2 the newspa-
per printed extensive, verbatim excerpts from the record 23 and mounted
a public assault on both the Review Board and the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court. In an editorial announcing publication of the transcript
excerpts, the Inquirer wrote,
Charges of unethical conduct, particularly involving political
manipulation of the judiciary, against a member of the high-
est court in the state, are tantamount to an indictment of the
constitutional foundations of the state. If the state, the entire
machinery of government, cannot deal with such an indict-
ment in a manner that earns public trust, those foundations
are threatened.24
The newspaper later concluded that the Review Board "ha[d] been
publicly exposed as a self-serving, evidence ignoring mutual protection
society dedicated to the perpetuation of a judicial system whose founda-
tions [were] beset by moral rot."'25
C. State Judicial Conduct Organizations
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have judicial conduct
organizations.2" Like Pennsylvania's Review Board, these commissions
Is Id.
19 Id.
20 See Phila. Inquirer, May 8, 1983, at 1A, col. 4.
21 Id.
22 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
2s See Phila. Inquirer, May 8, 1983, at 14A-17A; Phila. Inquirer, May 9, 1983,
at 1OA-13A; Phila. Inquirer, May 10, 1983, at 14A-17A; Phila. Inquirer, May 11,
1983, at 12A-15A; Phila. Inquirer, May 12, 1983, at 24A-27A.
2' See Phila. Inquirer, May 8, 1983, at 1A, col. 4 (editorial).
2' See Phila. Inquirer, May 13, 1983, at 14A, col. 1.
21 See ALA.. CONsT. amend. 328, §§ 6.17, 6.18; ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 10;
ARIZ. CONST. VI.I, §§ 1-6; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1001 to 22-1005 (Supp. 1983);
CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 8, 18; COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 51, 51q-5lu (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CONsT. art. IV, § 37; D.C. Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 11-1521-9, 84
Stat. 492 (1970); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12; GA. CONsT. art. VI, § 7, paras. 6-7;
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are authorized to receive complaints and conduct preliminary investiga-
tions.2" Initial investigations in all jurisdictions are confidential.28
In cases where preliminary investigations reveal that allegations of
misconduct merit further action, these conduct organizations may hold
formal hearings. 9 If a judge is found guilty of misconduct, the commis-
sions may recommend sanctions to the state supreme courts.30 Provi-
sions in thirty-two states permit or require post-investigative proceed-
ings to be conducted in secret, 1 and nine of those states mandate that
HAWAII CONsT. art. VI, § 5; IDAHO CODE §§ 1-2101 to 1-2103 (1979); ILL. CONST.
art. 6, § 15b-15q; IND. CONST. art. VII, § 9; IOWA CONST. art. V, § 19; IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 605.26-605.32 (West 1975); KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 15; Ky. CONST. § 121;
LA. CONST. art. V, § 25; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-B (Supp. 1983); MD.
CONST. art. IV, § 4A-4B; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211C, §§ 1-4 (West Supp.
1983); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30(1); MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 9; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 490.15 (West Supp. 1983); Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 177A; Mo. CONST. art. V,
§ 24; MONT. CODE ANN., §§ 3-1-1101 to 3-1-1126 (1981); NEB. CONST. art. V, §§
28-30; NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 21; N.H. COMM. ON JUD. CONDUCT S. CT. R. 39;
N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 5; N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §
22; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-375 (1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 27-23-02 to 27-23-12 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.11 (Page
1981); OKLA. CONST. art. VII-A, §§ 2-7; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 1.410-1.480 (1979); PA.
CONST. art. V, § 24; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-16-1 to 8-16-13 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CONST.
art. V, § 13; S.D. CONsT. art. V, § 9; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-5-201 to 17-5-312
(1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-27 (Supp. 1983); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 36; VA.
CONsT. art. VI, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 9; W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 757.83 to 757.93 (West 1981); Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 6.
17 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-511 (West Supp. 1983); IND. CODE
ANN. § 33-2.1-5-6 (Burns 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-5-301 (1980).
'8 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. & CRIM. R. CODE § 902 (West 1981); IND. CODE ANN. §
33-2.1-5-3 (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3334 (Purdon 1981).
2 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-1003(3), (4) (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 211C, § 2 (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-23-06
(Supp. 1983).
30 See, e.g., COLO. COMM. ON JUD. QUALIFS. R. 3(a), in 7A COLO. REV. STAT.
at 512 (1977); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3333(a) (Purdon 1981). A few bodies may
punish judges themselves. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-51n(a) (West Supp.
1983).
31 See ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.011(b) (1982); ARIZ. COMM'N ON JUD. QUALIFS.
R. 10, in ARIZONA RULES OF CT. at 723 (1983); CAL. RULES FOR CENSURE, RE-
MOVAL, RETIREMENT OR PRIVATE ADMONISHMENT OF JUDGES R. 902, in CALIFOR-
NIA RULES OF CT. at 121 (1984); COLO. CONST. art., VI § 2 3(3)(g); DEL. CT. ON
THE JUD. R. 10(d), in 16 DEL. CODE ANN. at 7 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-
1528(a) (1980); HAWAII S. CT. R. 26.4(a); IDAHO CODE § 1-2103 (1979); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 605.28 (West 1975); Ky. S. CT. R. 4.130(1), in 18 Ky. REV. STAT. at
405 (1983); LA. S. CT. R. XXXIII (23)(a), in LOUISIANA RULES OF CT. at 21 (1984);
ME. COMM. ON JUD. RESP. AND DISABILITY R. 8, in MAINE RULES OF CT. at XXVI
(1983); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4-B; MASS. COMM'N ON JUD. CONDUCT R. 3, in
MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF CT. at 366 (1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-19-19 (Supp.
1982); Mo. S. CT. R. 12.23, in MISSOURI RULES OF CT. at 75; NEV. COMM. ON JUD.
DISCIPLINE REV. P.R. 4(a); N.H. S. CT. R. 40(3)(a)-(c); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32;
N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 44(4), 45 (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377(a)
(1981); GOV'T OF THE JUD. OF OHIO R. 11(21), in RULES GOVERNING THE CTS. OF
OHIO at 772; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1658 (West Supp. 1983); 42 PA. CONS.
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the record of all proceedings (and acknowledgement that such proceed-
ings took place) never be made public unless formal sanctions are
imposed. 2
The American Adjudicature Society reported that during the three
years from 1980 to 1982 state judicial conduct organizations received
nearly 12,000 complaints about state judges.33 Following post-investi-
gative proceedings, sanctions were imposed in 276 cases; 34 the thirty-
two jurisdictions that allow confidential post-investigative proceedings 5
STAT. ANN. § 3334 (Purdon 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16-13 (Supp. 1983) (confi-
dential unless judge involved requests otherwise); S.C. S. CT. R. 34(33)(a), (b), in 22
S.C. CODE ANN., at 31 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-
1A app. (Rule 4) (1969); TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 1-a(10) (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-7-30 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (1979); WASH. JUD.
QUALIFS. COMM'N R. 6, in I WASHINGTON CT. RULES ANN. at 14 (Supp. 1983)
(referring to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.64.110 (Supp. 1984)); WYo. JUD. SUPER-
VISORY COMM'N R. 7, in WYOMING CT. RULES at 485 (1983).
32 See DEL. CT. ON THE JUD. R. 10(d), in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, at 6 (1981);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1528(a) (1981); HAWAII S. CT. R. 26.4(a); KY. JUD. RETIRE-
MENT AND REMOVAL COMM'N R. 4.130(1) (permanently confidential unless otherwise
ordered by the state supreme court), in 18 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. at 405 (1983); LA. S.
CT. R. XXXIII(23), in LOUISIANA RULES OF CT. at 20 (1984); ME. COMM. ON JUD.
RESP. AND DISABILITY R. 8, in MAINE RULES OF CT. at XXVI (1983); MASS.
COMM'N ON JUD. CONDUCT R.P. 3(a), in MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF CT. at 366
(1984); NEV. COMM'N ON JUD. DISCIPLINE REV. INTERIM P.R. 4(a), (b); N.H. S. CT.
R. 40(3); S.C. S. CT. R. 34-33(a), (b), in 22 S.C. CODE ANN. at 131 (Law Co-op
Supp. 1983) (unless sanction is private reprimand).
" In 1980 there were 4191 complaints reported. See Center Surveys Commission
Dispositions, JUD. CUNDUCT REP., Fall 1981, at 3. In 1981 complaints totaled 3493.
See Commissions Report Dispositions of 1981 Complaints, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Fall
1982, at 3. There were 4203 complaints reported in 1982. See Center Surveys Commis-
sion Complaint Dispositions, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Fall 1983, at 3 (proof sheet). The
total for the three years was 11,887.
These figures underestimate the actual number of complaints received because sev-
eral states do not report these data. See Center Surveys Commission Dispositions, supra
(no 1980 figures from four states); Commissions Report Dispositions of 1981 Com-
plaints, supra (no 1981 figures from eleven states); Center Surveys Complaint Disposi-
tions, supra (no 1982 figures from thirteen states).
During these three years, 3438, 2986, and 3128 of the complaints received were
dismissed, respectively. See Center Surveys Commission Dispositions, supra (1980
figures); Commissions Report Dispositions of 1981 Complaints, supra (1981 figures);
Center Surveys Complaint Dispositions, supra (1982 figures). Of the 11,887 complaints
received during the three-year period, see supra, 9552 (80.4%) were dismissed.
3" During these three years, 75, 83, and 118 post-investigative dispositions were
reported, respectively. See Center Surveys Commission Dispositions, supra note 33
(1980 figures); Commissions Report Dispositions of 1981 Complaints, supra note 33
(1981 figures); Center Surveys Complaint Dispositions, supra note 33 (1982 figures).
The following dispositions were included in this category: private censure, public cen-
sure, suspension without pay, involuntary retiremdnt, and removal from office.
No statistics are available for the number of post-investigative proceedings. See
Center Surveys Commission Dispositions, supra note 33; Commissions Report Disposi-
tions of 1981 Complaints, supra note 33; Center Surveys Complaint Dispositions,
supra note 33.
31 See supra note 31.
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reported 167 of these dispositions."6 These figures indicate that allega-
tions of state judicial misconduct are common and that many such alle-
gations lead to formal proceedings that are conducted in secret.
II. RELEVANT CASE LAW
Whether there exists a first amendment right of access to confiden-
tial state judicial disciplinary proceedings3 7 has, with one exception, 8
never been decided by any court.39 There are, however, several cases in
which the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state supreme
courts have considered first amendment access rights in varying con-
texts.4 0 These cases provide the background against which a right of
access to judicial disciplinary proceedings will be considered.
A. Early Supreme Court Cases
During the 1970's4 1 four right of access cases reached the Supreme
Court. In each case the claimed right of access was rejected.42
" Alaska (0); Arizona (2); California (21); Colorado (0); Delaware (0); District
of Columbia (0); Hawaii (0); Idaho (1); Iowa (no figures reported); Kentucky (6);
Louisiana (3); Maine (0); Maryland (1); Massachusetts (0); Mississippi (7); Missouri
(14); Nevada (1); New Hampshire (2); New Mexico (3); New York (56); North Caro-
lina (4); Ohio (no figures reported); Oklahoma (0); Pennsylvania (3); Rhode Island (0);
South Carolina (7); South Dakota (0); Texas (27); Utah (1); Virginia (no figures re-
ported); Washington (8); Wyoming (0). See Center Surveys Commission Dispositions,
supra note 33; Commissions Report Dispositions of 1981 Complaints, supra note 33;
Center Surveys Complaint Dispositions, supra note 33.
" The first amendment has been held applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
31 See infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
'9 First Amendment Coalition Memorandum, supra note 14, at 12; Hurowitz,
Peeking Behind Judicial Robes: A First Amendment Analysis of Confidential Investiga-
tions of the Judiciary, 2 COMM/ENT 707, 724 (1980).
The Supreme Court did not reach this issue in Landmark Communications v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). There, the Court held that the first amendment bars
imposition of criminal sanctions by a state on a newspaper for the paper's publication
of legally acquired, truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of a judicial
board of inquiry. See id. at 837-38. The Court stated, "We do not have before us any
constitutional challenge to a State's power to keep the Commission's proceedings confi-
dential . . . . Nor does Landmark argue for any constitutionally compelled right of
access for the press to those proceedings." Id. at 837 (citations omitted).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 43-84.
4' The Court decided two cases in 1965 that had right of access implications. In
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), the Court held that the first amendment did not
guarantee a citizen the right to travel to Cuba. See id. at 16. In Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965), the Court held that televising of criminal proceedings constituted an
inherent violation of a defendant's due process rights. See id. at 544; see also id. at 552
(Warren, C.J., concurring).
42 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion); Nixon v.
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
[Vol. 132:1163
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In Nixon v. Warner Communications43 the Court held that the
first amendment rights of the press were not violated by a federal court
order denying them copies of audio tapes played in court during a
criminal trial."" Stating that the press had no greater right of access
than the general public,45 the Court concluded that, because the public
"never had physical access" to the tapes, the press had no right to such
access. 46 In Pell v. Procunier'7 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,4s
the Court held that prison rules preventing the press from interviewing
state49 and federal prisoners" did not run afoul of the first amendment.
The Court reasoned that, because the public had no right of access to
individual prisoners and because the press had no greater right of ac-
cess than the public, the press had no right of access to individual pris-
oners. 51 Finally, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. ,52 a plurality of the Court
concluded that the first amendment did not grant the press a right of
access to film and photograph inmates for broadcast purposes.5"
B. Recent Supreme Court Cases
Notwithstanding its holdings in the early access cases,"M the Court
U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
43 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In discussing a right of access, this Comment uses "press"
and "public" interchangeably because the Court has repeatedly stated that the press
has no greater first amendment rights than the public. See, e.g., id. at 609; Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972)
(and cases cited therein). But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 586 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (raising possibility that
press might be more entitled to right of access); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart,
J., dissenting); Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
44 Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 609-10.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 609.
47 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
48 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
4, Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35.
50 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 846-47.
51 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 834 ("The Constitution does not.., require government
to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public
generally."); Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850 ("We find this case constitutionally indistinguish-
able from [Pell] and thus fully controlled by the holding in that case."). This is the
same type of argument the Court invoked in Warner Communications. See supra text
accompanying notes 43-46.
52 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (4-3 decision). Chief Justice Burger wrote the plurality
opinion, in which Justices White and Rehnquist joined. Justice Stewart concurred in
the judgment in a separate opinion more sympathetic to the constitutional right of ac-
cess. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Powell
joined. Justices Marshall and Blackmun took no part in the decision.
5S See id. at 9.
' See supra text accompanying notes 43 (Warner Communications), 47 (Pell), 48
(Saxbe) & 52 (Houchins). These cases may plausibly be read as leaving undecided the
1984]
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did not wholly forsake the notion that the first amendment granted af-
firmative rights of access. In Branzburg v. Hayes,55 while discussing
constitutional protections relevant to news gathering by the press, the
Court stated, "[It is not] suggested that news gathering does not qualify
for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 56
This kernel of dictum germinated in 1980 when the Court held in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia57 that the press and public had
a first amendment right to attend state criminal trials.5" Although the
import of this case was weakened by the absence of a majority opin-
ion,59 the decision was pivotal because it marked the Court's first recog-
issue whether a right of access actually existed in the particular circumstances. With
the exception of the Houchins plurality opinion, see supra text accompanying notes 52-
53, the Court rejected the press's contentions by arguing that the press had no greater
right of access than the public and, because the public had not been granted access in
any of the situations in question, the press was not entitled to such access. See Warner
Communications, 435 U.S. at 609; Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. The
Court failed to address the fundamental issue of whether the public, and thus the press,
had a right of access. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 839-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Saxbe, 417
U.S. at 856-64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
55 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that first amendment does not provide a constitu-
tional privilege to a newspaper reporter to refuse to reveal the identity of sources to
grand juries investigating alleged illegal activities by those sources).
" Id. at 681 (dictum). See also id. at 707; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion). But see Houchins, 438 U.S. at
10-11 (plurality opinion) (Branzburg dictum "affords no basis for the claim that the
First Amendment compels others-private persons or governments-to supply
information.").
57 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
" See id. at 580.
" The case produced seven opinions. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices
White and Stevens, emphasized the historical openness of criminal trials in the United
States, see id. at 564-69, 573-74, and, in support of a constitutional right of access,
invoked a multiplicity of first amendment doctrines: a right to receive information and
ideas, a right of access, a right to gather information, and a right of assembly. See id. at
576-78.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed with the significance of the
criminal trial's traditional public character, see id. at 589-93, 597-98 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment), but he emphasized the first amendment's "structural role...
in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government," see id. at 587
(citations omitted). Brennan rested his opinion on the relationship between this struc-
tural role of the first amendment and open trials. See id. at 589-98; cf. id. at 569-73
(plurality opinion) (discussing cathartic and prophylactic benefits of open trials).
Justices Stevens and White wrote separate concurring opinions, and Justices Stew-
art and Blackmun wrote individual opinions concurring in the judgment; Justice Rehn-
quist was the sole dissenter.
Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case, but he had
already expressed the opinion that the first amendment conferred a right of access upon
reporters to attend pretrial suppression hearings. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 n.11 (referring to Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397-98 (1979)).
Just one year earlier, the Court had held that the press and public had no sixth
[Vol. 132:1163
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nition of a constitutional right of access.
Two years later the Court marshalled its only majority opinion to
date in support of a first amendment right of access. In Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court60 the Court held unconstitutional a Massa-
chusetts statute that, in cases of alleged sexual offenses against minors,
closed trials to the press during the victim's testimony.61
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan asserted that the general
first amendment right of access was supported by "the common under-
standing that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs." 2 As for the specific right of
access to criminal trials, Justice Brennan explained that two features of
the criminal trial were particularly relevant: "First, the criminal trial
historically has been open to the press and general public .... Second,
the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role
in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a
whole."6" Describing the functional role, Justice Brennan stated that
access enhanced the factfinding process, fostered the appearance of jus-
tice, and promoted self-government by allowing the public "to partici-
pate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process.""
Having confirmed the existence of such a right, the Court stated
that it was not absolute, 5 but could be overridden by sufficiently
weighty reasons: "Where . . . the State attempts to deny the right of
access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must
be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 6 The Court
amendment right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing in which the parties and
the court had agreed to a closure order. -See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
394 (1979). This may partially explain the Court's disunity in Richmond Newspapers.
See Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The First Amendment
As Sword, 1980 Sup. CT. Rav. 1, 2 (suggesting that the result in Richmond Newspa-
pers was influenced by Gannett and the criticism it provoked).
60 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
61 Id. at 602.
62 Id. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
6S 457 U.S. at 605-06.
" Id. at 606. See infra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, stressing her belief that the holding
had no ramifications outside the criminal trial context. See id. at 611 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment). Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented,
arguing that access was not justified because there was a history of exclusion of the
public from trials involving sexual assaults. See id. at 613-14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
He also objected to the "wooden application of the rigid standard" adopted by the
majority, see id. at 615, and concluded that the state interests in this case outweighed
whatever right of access existed. See id. at 616-20. Justice Stevens dissented on the
ground that there was no live controversy. See id. at 620-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 606.
66 Id. at 606-07 (citations omitted). In Richmond Newspapers the Court declined
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concluded that the interests asserted by the state, the desire to protect
minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment
and to encourage victims of such crimes to come forward and testify,
did not justify the mandatory closure statute in question.67
In its most recent pronouncement on rights of access, the Court
considered a California trial court order that closed individual voir dire
proceedings for six weeks during a rape and murder trial.6 8 A unani-
mous Court held in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court69 that the
closure order violated the Constitution."
The majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger cited both Globe
and Richmond Newspapers favorably,"1 but it did not specifically
ground the right of open voir dire proceedings in the first amendment.
Rather, while noting that the case "focuse[d] on First, rather than Fifth
Amendment values," 72 the Chief Justice wrote, "[H]ow we allocate the
'right' to openness as between the accused and the public, or whether
we view it as a component inherent in the system benefiting both, is not
crucial. '7 38 Justice Stevens's, concurrence, however, placed the right of
access squarely within the ambit of the first amendment,7 4 and the ma-
jority's analysis was virtually identical to the Globe analysis.
75
to specify what circumstances would justify closing a trial. See Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 581 n.18.
67 See Globe, 457 U.S. at 607-10.
68 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 52 U.S.L.W. 4113 (U.S. Jan. 17,
1984).
69 52 U.S.L.W. 4113 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1984).
70 Id. at 4116. Justice Marshall joined only the judgment of the Court. See id. at
4118-19 (Marshall, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 4115 (majority opinion).
78 Id. at 4115 n.8.
78 Id. at 4115.
7' Id. at 4117-18 (Stevens, J., concurring). Quoting from Justice Brennan's Globe
opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized that access to voir dire proceedings would make a
"positive contribution" to the "process of self-government." Id. at 4118.
" The Chief Justice first reviewed the history of open trials and the role of jury
selection in that history, concluding that since the fifteenth century the accused had
enjoyed the right to challenge jurors in open court. See id. at 4114-15 (majority opin-
ion). Burger then explained that such openness assured public scrutiny of the proceed-
ings. See id. He also noted that public attendance served a role in the operation of the
trial by assuring a ready source of potential jurors in case challenges depleted the pool
of qualified jurors. See id. at 4115. The Chief Justice concluded that "[o]penness thus
enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so
essential to public confidence in the system." Id.
Acknowledging that the Constitution mandated open voir dire proceedings, Burger
stated that an order closing such proceedings was subject to the standard of scrutiny
specified in Globe: the closure must be necessitated by a compelling governmental inter-
est narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See id. He concluded that the closure order
in question failed to satisfy these requirements. See id. at 4116.
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C. Lower Court Cases Since Globe and Richmond Newspapers
The federal courts of appeals, invoking Globe and Richmond
Newspapers, have extended access rights to new contexts. In the crimi-
nal trial arena the lower federal courts have held that the public/press
access rights recognized by the Supreme Court mandate access to pre-
trial suppression hearings 7 6 pre-trial due process and entrapment hear-
ings,7 and bail reduction hearings.78 These courts have also relied on
Globe and Richmond Newspapers to justify access to pre-trial docu-
ments.79 Beyond the criminal trial context, the appeals courts have ex-
tended access rights to civil trials ° and civil trial documents.8 '
State supreme courts also have cited Globe and Richmond Newspa-
pers in recognizing first amendment access rights beyond the criminal
trial.8 2 Specifically, these courts have extended access rights to pre-trial
suppression hearings" and other pre-trial proceedings."
7 See United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 554 (3d Cir. 1982). But cf. San Jose Mercury-News v.
Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 638 P.2d 655, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1982) (right of
access to preliminary hearings, as opposed to suppression hearings, does not arise under
the Constitution).
S7See United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 554, 557 (3d Cir. 1982).
7'8 See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363-64 (5th Cir. 1983). See gener-
ally Foley & Kenner, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers and
Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 416, 432-38 (1981) (discussing access to pretrial
proceedings).
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Press-Enterprise, a first amendment right
of access to voir dire proceedings had been recognized by several lower federal courts.
See United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167-69 (9th Cir. 1982); In re United
States ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1980) (right of
access presumed in absence of inquiry into alternative solutions).
7' See Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th
Cir. 1983) (stating that "[tihere is no reason to distinguish pretrial proceedings and the
documents filed in regard to them").
80 See Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983) (civil trial per-
taining to the release or incarceration of prisoners and the conditions of their confine-
ment); see also Foley & Kenner, supra note 78, at 430-32 (discussion of access to civil
trial proceedings).
81 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1176-81
(6th Cir. 1983). The only court of appeals case since Richmond Newspapers sustaining
a denial of access came before Globe was decided. See Sacramento Bee v. United States
Dist. Court, 656 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding district court order excluding
press from certain portions of a criminal trial), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982).
82 See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
83 See Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc., 297 Md. 68, 465 A.2d 426 (1983);
State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 654 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1982).
" See State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983); see also Herald Ass'n
v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 419 A.2d 323 (1980) (assuming Richmond Newspapers extends
to pretrial proceedings but basing access right on other grounds); cf. Lexington Herald-
Leader Co. v. Meigs, 660 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. 1983) (affirming trial court order closing
voir dire to press but recognizing constitutional implications of closure).
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D. District Court Disposition of the Larsen Case
On February 1, 1984, the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania issued an opinion on the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's provisions governing the confidentiality of its judicial
disciplinary proceedings. 5 In First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial
Inquiry and Review Board,86 the only court decision to date to assess
the constitutionality of closed judicial disciplinary proceedings, Judge
Louis Pollak held that the first amendment does not compel the Judi-
cial Inquiry and Review Board to open its post-investigative proceed-
ings to the public but that, upon completion of such proceedings, the
amendment does require the Review Board to make public the records
of the proceedings, regardless of their outcome. 7
On the threshold issue of whether restrictions on access to post-
investigative proceedings raised first amendment concerns, Judge Pollak
initially canvassed the relevant Supreme Court cases from Branzburg
to Press-Enterprise.8 8 He found that a "doctrinal consensus" could be
distilled from the cases: "A governmental restriction on public and
press access to information about matters of public concern presents a
First Amendment question."8 That the activities of the Review Board
were "matters of substantial public concern," stated Judge Pollak,
"hardly requires argument."90
As for the specific contours of a right of access to judicial discipli-
nary proceedings, Pollak started from the premise that "a restriction on
public and press access can be sustained, but only to the extent that it
demonstrably advances significant governmental interests."'" Judge
Pollak considered both the public's interests in open proceedings and
the state's interests in confidentiality 2 and concluded that the constitu-
tional conflict could be resolved by "maximizing these twin interests."93
His solution was "to permit access to all cases in which the Board pre-
fers formal charges-but to defer the time of access until the Board's
filing with the Supreme Court of a transcript which fully records the
8" First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., No. 83-0579
Civ. (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1984).
" No. 83-0579 Civ. (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1984).
817 Id., slip op. at 57-58. Judge Pollak required the Review Board to submit a
record of all post-investigative proceedings to the state supreme court. See id. Upon
submission these records become public documents.
8 Id. at 33-46.
89 Id. at 46.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 51-57.
93 Id. at 57.
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Board's proceedings." 94
Judge Pollak thus recognized that first amendment interests are
implicated by governmental restrictions on public access to judicial dis-
ciplinary proceedings. He concluded, however, that in this context the
first amendment right is limited to post-disposition review of transcripts
and that the Review Board can hold its proceedings behind closed
doors.9"
Judge Pollak's analysis is at once too broad and too narrow. On
the one hand, his statement that the first amendment is infringed by
governmental restrictions on "matters of public concern""6 goes well
beyond any Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject of first
amendment access'rights. 97 On the other hand, his standard of review
for such infringements-the requirement of a "significant governmental
interest""'-falls short of the compelling interest standard articulated
by the Court in Globe99 and affirmed in Press-Enterprise.
100
In response to the first concern-the overbreadth of the first
amendment interest recognized by Judge Pollak-part III examines the
narrower first amendment access right identified by the Supreme Court
in Globe and considers whether that right extends to judicial discipli-
nary proceedings. In response to the second concern-Judge Pollak's
relaxed standard of review-part IV discusses the interests weighing
against a right of access to disciplinary proceedings and evaluates them
in light of the more demanding compelling interest standard adopted by
the Supreme Court.
III. APPLICATION OF THE Globe ANALYSIS TO JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Recognizing that the Supreme Court has interpreted the first
amendment to encompass an affirmative right of access to criminal tri-
als, 01 the question arises whether post-investigative judicial discipli-
nary proceedings also must be open to the public. This part of the
Comment discusses whether such a right is supported by the Court's
reasoning in the criminal trial context. Both the historic character of
judicial disciplinary proceedings and the structural role of access to
9 Id. at 57-58.
95 Id.
91 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 41-75 and accompanying text.
98 First Amendment Coalition, slip op. at 46.
9 Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
100 52 U.S.L.W. at 4115.
101 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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these proceedings are considered.
A. Historic Character
1. Framework of Analysis
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Su-
perior Court °2 noted that criminal trials have long been open to the
public"0 3 and explained that this tradition "has been viewed as signifi-
cant in constitutional terms not only 'because the Constitution carries
the gloss of history,' but also because 'a tradition of accessibility implies
the favorable judgment of experience.' "104 There are four possible in-
terpretations of the Court's historical analysis in Globe; each has differ-
ent implications for a right of access to judicial disciplinary
proceedings.
First, history may be inconsequential. Notwithstanding his tribute
to tradition, 0 5 Justice Brennan swept aside, as irrelevant, assertions by
the state that criminal trials involving sexual offenses against minors
had historically been closed to the press and public, disposing of these
arguments in a footnote.108 The majority's slighting of history was
highlighted by Chief Justice Burger's dissent, which protested that the
majority was "ignor[ing] the weight of historical practice."1 °7
Second, an affirmative history of openness may be required before
the first amendment provides a right of access. Chief Justice Burger,
joined by Justice Rehnquist, took this position in his Globe dissent.1 08
After asserting that there was no uncontradicted history of open pro-
ceedings in cases involving sexual abuse of minors, 0 9 the Chief Justice
concluded that, absent such a history, there is "no support [for] the
proposition that closure of the proceedings . . . violates the First
Amendment." o
102 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
103 See id. at 605.
104 Id. (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring
in judgment) (footnote omitted)). See also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575
(plurality opinion) ("The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long
history of trials being presumptively open.").
1 See Globe, 457 U.S. at 605.
"06 See id. at 605 n.13; see also United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167
(9th Cir. 1982) (ackn6wledging history rationale but granting access to voir dire pro-
ceedings on second rationale of Globe, the functional value of access); Newman v.
Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 800-01 (11th Cir. 1983) (granting right of access to civil trials
without discussion of historical considerations).
107 See Globe, 457 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
10I See id. at 613-14.
109 See id. at 614.
110 Id.
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Third, Globe may turn not on an affirmative tradition of openness,
but rather on the absence of a tradition of secrecy."' This view would
militate against a right of access only where the proceedings in question
had traditionally been conducted in secret.
Finally, historical considerations may be pertinent only when there
is in fact some definite history. Thus, the absence of a history (of open-
ness or lack of secrecy) would simply render the history rationale irrel-
evant. This is the approach that two federal courts of appeals have
taken when extending the Globe and Richmond Newspapers holdings to
recently developed or increasingly significant proceedings."' For exam-
ple, in recognizing a right of access to bail reduction hearings, the Fifth
Circuit wrote, "Because the first amendment must be interpreted in the
context of current values and conditions, . . . the lack of an historic
M113tradition . . . does not bar our recognizing a right of access ....
2. Application to Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings
Unlike the criminal trial, which can claim a long and well-docu-
mented heritage, 4 judicial discipline is a child of contemporary times.
The first modern judicial conduct organization was created in 1960;115
over two-thirds of the present-day organizations came into existence
during the last fifteen years.116
111 In Richmond Newspapers Chief Justice Burger distinguished the issue of
prison access from that of criminal trial access on the grounds that prisons had been
traditionally closed to the public. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 n.11
(plurality opinion).
"2 See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Globe
and Richmond Newspapers to support access to bail reduction hearings); United States
v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982) ("We do not think that historical analysis
is relevant in determining whether there is a first amendment right of access to pretrial
criminal proceedings."; citing Richmond Newspapers to support access to pre-trial sup-
pression, due process, and entrapment hearings).
11 United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363.
14 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-69 (plurality opinion) (reviewing
historical openness of criminal trials).
115 . TESITOR & D. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2d ed.
1980); Schoenbaum, A Historical Look at Judicial Discipline, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1, 20 (1977). This organization, the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications,
did not effect its first removal of a judge by action of the supreme court until 1973. Id.
n6 I. TEsrrOR & D. SINKS, supra note 115, at 19-27 (Table 2). These modem
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Prior to the advent of the modern bodies, judicial discipline existed
primarily in theory.117 Impeachment,"' address,"' and recall 20 were
the traditional mechanisms for handling judicial misconduct and disa-
bility, 12 1 but they were ineffective and rarely used.'
22
This history behind judicial disciplinary proceedings would weigh
against access to these proceedings only if Globe is read to require an
affirmative history of openness, 123 for under such a reading, because
there is no tradition of openness associated with disciplinary proceed-
ings, there would be no historical support for access.124 However, this
117 See Greenburg, The Task ofJudging the Judges, 59 JUDICATURE 458, 460-61
(1976) (impeachment and address "patently inadequate"); W. BRArrHWAITE, WHO
JUDGES THE JUDGES 12-13 (1971) ("The evidence taken as a whole raises the infer-
ence that impeachment is used only sporadically and address and recall hardly at all.");
Buckley, The Commission on Judicial Qualifications: An Attempt to Deal with Judicial
Misconduct, 3 U.S.F.L. REV. 244, 250-51 (1969); Brand, The Discipline ofJudges, 46
A.B.A. J. 1315 (1960) ("[E]nd-result [of removal procedures] has been negligible.");
Shartel, Retirement and Removal of Judges, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOc'Y 133, 144-
46 (1936) (impeachment).
"s "Impeachment ... is a legislative proceeding in which the lower house acts as
grand jury and the upper house as trial court." W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 117, at
12. See generally Schoenbaum, supra note 115, at 5-8.
110 "Address . . . is a formal request from the legislature to the governor asking
him to remove a judge." W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 117, at 12. See generally
Schoenbaum, supra note 115, at 4-5.
120 "Recall ... is analogous to initiative and referendum; if a certain percentage of
the voters sign a petition to recall a judge, he must face a special election." W.
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 117, at 12. See generally Schoenbaum, supra note 115, at
8-9.
121 W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 117, at 12. Other available removal mecha-
nisms were used even less frequently. See Schoenbaum, supra note 115, at 2-4 (execu-
tive action); id. at 9-10 (popular vote); Shartel, supra note 117, at 142-44 (executive
action).
122 See supra note 117. Between 1900 and 1925 two judges were removed by
impeachment, Shartel, supra note 117, at 151 n.86, and three by address, id.; there are
no reports of successful recalls during that period. While three California judges were
recalled in 1932, 0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS
144 (1952), there was not a single successful impeachment in the twenty-one years
between 1928 and 1948. Id. at 142, 144.
In 1960 it was reported "that in forty of forty-five states, as far back as can be
recalled or determined, legislative attempts to invoke impeachment procedures have
been made in only seventeen states in a total of fifty-two instances. The results were
nineteen removals and three resignations." Brand, supra note 117, at 1315 n.2 (citing
Report of the Survey of the Legal Profession in Discipline ofJudges, 50 MICH. L. REV.
737 (1952)). Only five states used impeachment in the 15-year period before 1971, and
there were no instances of address. W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 117, at 13. The
recall of a Wisconsin judge in 1977 marked the first time that device had been used in
the United States since 1932. Schoenbaum, supra note 115, at 8 n.35.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
124 If the "lack of secrecy" view of the history rationale were accepted, a right of
access would be supported because judicial disciplinary proceedings have no history of
secrecy. See supra text accompanying note 111. If the history rationale were held to be
relevant only when there is some clear history, this rationale would not be a factor in
assessing a right of access to these proceedings because they are without such a history.
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is an unlikely reading of Globe. There, the proceedings to which the
Court mandated access had historically been closed,125 yet the majority
thought this to be irrelevant. 26 This indicates that a history of public
access to a proceeding does not dictate whether there is a constitutional
right of access to that proceeding. If historical considerations are there-
fore not dispositive, the issue of a right of access to judicial disciplinary
proceedings will turn on the second rationale advanced by the Court in
Globe: the functional role of access.
1 27
B. Functional Role of Access
1. Framework of Analysis
Writing for the majority in Globe, Justice Brennan explained how
public access to criminal trials plays a significant role in the "function-
ing of the judicial process and the government as a whole." 2"
Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with bene-
fits to both the defendant and to society as a whole. More-
over, public access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance
of fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the judicial
process. And in the broadest terms, public access to criminal
trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a
check upon the judicial process-an essential component in
our structure of self-government. 29
Open proceedings enhance the factfinding process because access
assures fairness to all parties concerned and discourages "perjury, the
See supra text accompanying notes 112-13. Finally, if history is considered inconse-
quential, it would not be a factor in the analysis at all. See supra text accompanying
notes 105-07.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
12 See supra text accompanying note 106.
127 Even if Globe can be construed as basing the right of access to criminal trials
on a history of access to those proceedings, this does not preclude recognition of a right
of access to judicial disciplinary proceedings. As several federal courts of appeals have
suggested, see supra text accompanying notes 112-13, the first amendment must be
interpreted in light of contemporary conditions. If access to newly developed proceed-
ings would serve the same function as has access to older proceedings that traditionally
have been open, the newer proceedings should also be open. Because judicial discipli-
nary proceedings are of recent vintage, the issue of access to these proceedings should
turn on the functions that such access would serve. This conclusion, like the conclusion
that history is not controlling, leads to a consideration of functional role of access, the
second rationale articulated by the Court in Globe.
128 Globe, 457 U.S. at 606.
129 Id. (footnotes omitted).
1984] 1179
1180 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 132:1163
misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or parti-
ality." ' Accurate factfinding is important because it reduces the likeli-
hood of a miscarriage of justice that could imprison an innocent person
and leave a guilty party at large."' 1
In addition to benefiting the factfinding process, access also pro-
motes the appearance of justice. 32 "[P]eople sense[] from experience
and observation that ...the means used to achieve justice must have
the support derived from public acceptance of both the process and its
results." ' 3 "Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrari-
ness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law."13 "
Finally, access promotes self-government by encouraging public
participation in and checking of the judicial process.13 5 Two concepts
are implicit in this facet of access. First, by promoting public participa-
tion in judicial proceedings, access facilitates education of the public
about an important governmental function,"3 6 thus ensuring that the
"constitutionally protected 'discussion of governmental affairs' is an in-
formed one."1 37 Second, the right of access provides a check against
potential abuses of judicial power," 8' a check "akin in purpose to the
other checks and balances that infuse our system of government." 9
Together, education and checking advance the fundamental aim of the
first amendment: "to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively
participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-
government.
'1 40
130 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 (plurality opinion).
131 Id. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
133 Globe, 457 U.S. at 606.
133 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (plurality opinion), cited in Globe,
457 U.S. at 606.
13" Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring in judg-
ment), cited in Globe, 457 U.S. at 606 n.15.
135 Globe, 457 U.S. at 606.
138 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (citing J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1834, at 438).
137 Globe, 457 U.S. at 604-05.
Id. at 606 n.16 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570-71; id. at 596
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)).
139 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring in judg-
ment), cited in Globe, 457 U.S. at 606 n.16.
140 See Globe, 457 U.S. at 604. Checking judicial abuse through public access to
criminal trials serves the principle of self-government embedded in the first amendment
because of the judiciary's influential role in government. Although Justice Brennan
does not discuss this nexus in Globe, his Richmond Newspapers opinion makes clear his
reasoning: "[Jiudges are not mere umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a
coordinate branch of government .... [C]ourt rulings impose official and practical con-
sequences upon members of society at large." Thus, "the trial ... is a genuine govern-
mental proceeding." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 595-96 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (footnote omitted).
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2. Application to Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings
The first interest that access to criminal trials serves, the quality
and integrity of the factfinding process, is as pertinent to disciplinary
proceedings as it is to criminal trials, for these proceedings have a
factfinding component similar to that of their public counterparts. 14
Access in this context would generate the same salutary benefits for the
factfinding process as does access to criminal trials; the identity of the
defendant would seem to be unimportant.
As for the second interest, respect for the judicial system and the
appearance of justice, the defendant's identity would appear to be criti-
cal-the fact that a judge is on trial makes the argument for access to
disciplinary proceedings even more compelling than in the case of a
traditional criminal trial. Because notions of honesty, integrity, and im-
partiality lie at the heart of the American judicial process, there may be
no greater threat to the appearance of justice than the secrecy that en-
shrouds proceedings focusing on alleged misconduct of judges. The ap-
pearance of justice is tainted if, in the words of Justice Frankfurter, we
endeavor "to protect the court as a mystical entity or the judges as indi-
viduals or as annointed priests set apart from the community and
spared the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants are
exposed."' 42 This threat is further exacerbated by the fact that many of
the jurisdictions that permit secret post-investigative proceedings also
have judicial review boards controlled by judges.,
4 3
141 The factfinding process in judicial disciplinary proceedings includes such
things as witness testimony, admission of documents, and physical examinations. See,
e.g., PA. JUD. INQUIRY AND REV. BD. R.P. 6(b).
142 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 291-92 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
14' Arizona: five judges, two attorneys, and two citizens, see ARmz. CONsT. art 6.1,
§ 1; Colorado: five judges, two attorneys, and two citizens, see COLO. CONsT. art. VI, §
23(3)(a); Delaware: five judges, see DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37; Kentucky: three judges,
one attorney, and two citizens, see Ky. CONST. § 121; Maryland: four judges, two
attorneys, and one citizen, see MD. CONsT. art. IV, § 4A; Mississippi: four judges, two
citizens, and one attorney, see MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 177A; Ohio: five judges, see OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.11 (Page 1981) (Commission of Judges); Pennsylvania: five
judges, two attorneys, and two "non-lawyer electors," see PA. CONsT. art. 5, § 18(a);
South Carolina: seven judges and two attorneys, see S.C. S. CT. R. 34(3)(b) in 22 S.C.
CODE ANN. at 121 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1983).
Judges play a significant role in many of the remaining panels that permit post-
investigative proceedings to be confidential: District of Columbia: five members, one
judge, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1522(a) (1981); Hawaii: seven members, four of
whom may be judges, see HAWAII COMM'N ON JUD. DISCIPLINE R. 26.1(a); Idaho:
seven members, two judges, see IDAHO CODE § 1-2101 (1979); Louisiana: nine mem-
bers, three judges, see LA. CONsT. art. 5, § 25(A); Maine: seven members, two judges,
see COMM'N ON JUD. REsP. AND DISABILrrY R. 1, in MAINE RULES OF CT. at XXV
(1983); Massachusetts: nine members, three judges, see MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 211C, §
1 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Missouri: six members, two judges, see Mo.
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Judge Pollak's decision in First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial
Inquiry and Review Board'" does not adequately address this concern
for the appearance of fairness.' 4 5 Opening the transcripts upon comple-
tion of the investigation is helpful, but opening the disciplinary pro-
ceedings to the public and press would go much further toward en-
gendering respect for the judicial process. 4" Public knowledge that trial
proceedings were being witnessed and reported would strongly enhance
the appearance of justice.
The third interest that access furthers, according to Globe's func-
tional analysis, is the promotion of self-government through public par-
ticipation in and checking of the judicial process. 47 As discussed
above,'14 access to criminal trials advances self-government by educat-
ing the public about an important governmental function, thus assuring
informed discussion of governmental matters, and by checking judicial
CONST. art. 5, § 24, cl. 1; Nevada: seven members, two judges, see NEv. CONST. art. 6,
§ 21, cl. 2; New Hampshire: seven members, three judges, see N.H. S. CT. R. 39(2)(a);
New Mexico: nine members, two judges, see N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32; North Caro-
lina: seven members, three judges, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-375(a) (1981); South
Dakota: seven members, two judges, see S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 16-1A-2 (1979);
Texas: eleven members, four judges, see TEX. CONST. art. 5; Virginia: seven members,
three judges, see VA. CODE § 2.1-37.3 (1979); Washington: seven members, three
judges, see WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31, amend. 71; Wyoming: seven members, two
judges, see Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 6(a).
When the Pennsylvania Judicial and Inquiry Review Board voted not to recom-
mend sanctions against Justice Larsen, see supra note 17 and accompanying text, five
of the six votes in favor of exoneration were cast by judges. Phila. Inquirer, May 8,
1983, at 6C, col. 1 (editorial).
144 No. 83-0579 Civ. (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1984).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 132-34; supra text preceding and accompa-
nying note 142.
148 The controversy arising out of the Larsen proceedings illustrates the adverse
effect of closed proceedings on public respect for the judiciary. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 24 & 25; infra text accompanying note 168.
147 Because the "judicial process" with which Globe was concerned is not at issue
in judicial disciplinary proceedings, one might argue that this aspect of the functional
role analysis would not support access to such proceedings. In other words, one could
argue that the specific "judicial process" with which Globe was concerned was the
criminal trial, and, because judicial disciplinary proceedings are not criminal trials,
there can be no promotion of self-government by participation in and checking of the
"judicial process" as envisioned by the Court in Globe.
Notwithstanding the superficial appeal this argument may hold, it should be dis-
missed as formalism. Justice Brennan was not focusing on the judicial process itself in
Globe; rather, his attention was directed at the substantive value of self-government
furthered by public participation in and checking of that judicial process. To assess
properly the support provided by this component of the functional role rationale, the
analysis should not focus on whether the judicial process of disciplinary proceedings
possesses the same formal character as the judicial process of criminal trials. Instead, it
should consider whether access to these proceedings would generate the same benefits
for self-government as does access to criminal trials.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
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abuse. Access to judicial disciplinary proceedings would serve both
these interests.
First, access would promote education of the public about the im-
portant governmental judicial function by assuring availability of infor-
mation concerning officials responsible for execution of that func-
tion-the judges.14 9 Further, access would check abuse of judicial
power by assuring that those accused of such abuse were subjected to
prescribed legal process and, when appropriate, punished. The ultimate
result of access to disciplinary proceedings would be, as in Globe, the
advancement of effective citizen self-government.
Again, Judge Pollak's decision in First Amendment Coalition150
fails short. Public attendance of judicial disciplinary proceedings would
go much further toward maximizing self-government than would the
mere right to examine transcripts after the proceedings have ended. Ac-
tive public involvement in disciplinary proceedings would better serve
the Globe interest of an informed and participating citizenry.
In Globe the Court recognized a right of access to criminal trials
because access promoted three important interests: the quality and in-
tegrity of the factfinding process, the appearance of justice, and effective
citizen self-government. A parallel right of access to state judicial disci-
plinary proceedings would further all three of these interests.
IV. COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS
Various policies have been articulated in support of the confidenti-
ality surrounding post-investigative judicial disciplinary proceedings. 51
140 The Supreme Court has invoked this nexus between government officials and
government for first amendment purposes in the area of defamation. In holding that the
first amendment provided a high degree of protection to individuals whose speech de-
famed a public official, the Court argued that debate on public issues might often in-
clude "vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (public
figure must show speaker acted with "actual malice"). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTrrTIONAL LAW § 12-12, at 632-33 (1978) (stating that Court analogized defa-
mation at- issue in New York Times to seditious libel). The special status of public
officials was later highlighted by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1976),
where the Court held that a state could permit private figures to recover defamation
damages on a far less rigorous showing than the New York Times "actual malice" stan-
dard. See id. at 347.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 91-100.
'-" Because this Comment focuses on the confidentiality of post-investigative pro-
ceedings and does not advocate open preliminary investigative proceedings, one of the
principal arguments advanced for confidentiality, protection of complainants from re-
prisal, see Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835 (1978), is
not relevant, for the opening of post-investigative proceedings would not reveal the com-
plainant's identity to the accused judge in any circumstances where secret proceedings
do not already do so. In those states where an accused judge can confront the complain-
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In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court152 the Supreme Court
looked only to the circumstances of criminal trials when determining
whether there was a compelling government interest that would justify
closed proceedings in that case.153 Any effort to extend the right of ac-
cess recognized in Globe to contexts other than criminal trials must take
into account factors peculiar to those new contexts that might weigh
against such an extension. This part examines the factors that might
militate against a right of access to judicial disciplinary proceedings.
A. Protection of the Reputations of Judges
The primary argument offered in support of the confidentiality of
disciplinary proceedings is that it protects the reputations of accused
judges from unjust harm.1" The concern is that disgruntled litigants, or
others displeased with judges for reasons unrelated to standards of judi-
cial propriety, may file groundless charges intended only to harass those
judges. Confidentiality shields judges from the damage that might result
if such charges were made public.
1 5 5
A desire to protect judges from disclosure of vexatious and ground-
less accusations might well justify confidentiality during the investiga-
tive phase of an inquiry into alleged misconduct. Indeed, all states man-
date that preliminary investigations be confidential. 156 However, such a
concern would not support the confidentiality of post-investigative pro-
ceedings, proceedings that are initiated only after it has been deter-
mined that an allegation is not groundless.
15 7
B. Public Confidence in the Judiciary
The second principal argument advanced in defense of the confi-
dentiality of post-investigative proceedings is that it preserves public re-
ant during a formal proceeding, the complainant's identity is known, regardless of the
character of the proceeding. And in those states where the conduct organization prose-
cutes the complaint in its own name and the complainant need not testify at the formal
proceeding, the complainant's identity would remain unknown, even if the proceeding
were open to the public.
1 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835
(1978); Forbes v. Earle, 298 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1974).
15 See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 699,
710-12, 233 S.E.2d 120, 128-29 (1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
16 See supra note 28.
157 Formal proceedings are conducted only if the preliminary investigation reveals
that the allegation is of sufficient merit to warrant further action. See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE § 1-2103 (1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-19-21(2) (Supp. 1982).
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spect for the judiciary by preventing public disclosure of unfounded al-
legations of misconduct.1 58 This argument would allow disclosure only
in cases where a judge is found guilty of misconduct; all post-investiga-
tive proceedings would therefore be confidential because they take place
before guilt is established.
Underlying this argument is the premise that the secrecy of pro-
ceedings assures public ignorance of such proceedings and that such
ignorance, in turn, preserves public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary. Therefore, according to this argument, secrecy assures public
respect for the judiciary.
This argument should be dismissed for two reasons. First, the Su-
preme Court has expressly refuted the notion that secrecy in judicial
proceedings promotes public respect for the judiciary.159 The Court de-
clared in Globe that one of the specific benefits of public access to crim-
inal trials was that it "foster[ed] an appearance of fairness, thereby
heightening public respect for the judicial process." 160
In an earlier case the Court stated, "[A]n enforced silence [about
judicial proceedings], however limited, solely in the name of preserving
the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspi-
cion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.""" And
Chief Justice Burger expressed a similar view in Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia162 where he wrote, "People in an open society do
not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for
them to accept what they are prohibited from observing."' 68
This argument for secrecy should be rejected for a second reason:
it is based on the fallacious assumption that public ignorance of indi-
vidual proceedings will assure public respect for the judiciary as an
institution. Even if it were true that the public is often unaware of a
given proceeding, the public knows that disciplinary proceedings in
general do take place and that they are secret. 164 This knowledge is as
'6 See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835 (1978);
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 699, 712, 233 S.E.2d
120, 128 (1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); cf. Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley, 607 P.2d
1180, 1186 (Okla. 1980) (discussing confidentiality of investigative proceedings).
' See infra text accompanying notes 162-63.
160 Globe, 457 U.S. at 606 (footnote omitted). See also supra text accompanying
notes 132-34.
I'l Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) (holding unconstitutional a
contempt order issued against press agencies in response to their publication of views
on pending court matters).
12 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
lea Id. at 572.
16 These proceedings and their confidential nature are authorized by publicly en-
acted state statutes or publicly adopted constitutional provisions. See supra note 26
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detrimental to public respect for the judiciary as would be the knowl-
edge of any specific proceeding.
Further, notwithstanding confidentiality provisions, the public
may often be aware of particular proceedings. The Pennsylvania inves-
tigation of Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen provides a dramatic ex-
ample 165 -not only was it publicly revealed that Justice Larsen was
under investigation,16 but extensive, verbatim excerpts from the tran-
script of the post-investigative proceedings were published by the Phila-
delphia Inquirer,8 7 a major metropolitan newspaper. The adverse,
possibly catastrophic, impact on public respect for the judiciary that
may have resulted from the refusal to make public the record of the
Larsen proceedings was suggested by an editorial in the Inquirer:
The manner in which the board's investigation took place
and was concluded and the manner in which the two most
powerful judicial forces in the state vainly sought to keep the
sordidness secret make it obvious that no cure-and no be-
lievable process of diagnosis-can be expected from the Su-
preme Court or from the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board.
1 68
C. The Trend Toward Openness
A final consideration that undermines arguments favoring the con-
fidential nature of post-investigative proceedings is the fact that in re-
cent years an increasing number of states have repealed their confiden-
tiality provisions and have replaced them with ones requiring that these
proceedings be open.1 69 Public proceedings are now mandated in
nineteen states;1 70 five years ago only five states permitted public at-
(provisions creating organizations authorized to conduct proceedings); notes 31-32 (pro-
visions authorizing confidential post-investigative proceedings).
165 See supra text accompanying notes 15-25.
166 See Phila. Inquirer, May 7, 1983, at 1A, col. 1.
167 See supra note 23.
16 Phila. Inquirer, May 8, 1983, at 6C, col. 1 (editorial). See also supra text
accompanying notes 24-25.
169 See Commissions Fine Tune Rules on Confidentiality, Informal Resolutions,
JUD. CONDUCT REP., Winter 1982, at 1.
171 See ALA. CT. OF THE JUD. R.P. 9, in 23 ALA. CODE at 351 (Supp. 1983);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-1004 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-511(c) (West
Supp. 1984); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(d); GA. JUD. QUALIFS. COMM'N R. 18(a); ILL.
CONST. art. VI; IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2.1-5-3(b) (Burns 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
20-176 (1979); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 932.11(a), in 2 [Rules] MICHi. STAT. ANN. at 586;
MINN. BD. ON JUD. STANDARDS R. (9), in MINNESOTA RULES OF CT. at 767; MONT.
CODE ANN. § 3-1-1121 (1983); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 30(5); N.J. App. PRAC. R.
2:15-4(c), 2:15-20, in RULES GOVERNING THE CTS. OF NEW JERSEY at 197, 202
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tendance. 17 1 This trend suggests that many states have concluded that
the policies behind confidentiality do not outweigh those supporting
access.
CONCLUSION
The recent investigation into the conduct of Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Justice Rolf Larsen highlighted a controversial aspect of judicial
disciplinary procedures used in many states: post-investigative proceed-
ings are confidential. Both the press and public are excluded, and the
records of such proceedings often are sealed permanently.
The Supreme Court has held that the public and press have a first
amendment right of access to criminal trials. Recognition of a parallel
right of access to state judicial disciplinary proceedings follows from the
rationales articulated by the Court in the criminal trial context, and the
arguments advanced in support of confidentiality are outweighed by the
first amendment interests in public access.
(1984); N.D. STAT. § 27-23-03(5) (1983); OR. REv. STAT. § 1.420(2) (1981); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 17-5-394(b) (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 app. 1, pt. 4, rule 15
(Supp. 1983); W. VA. R. OF PROC. FOR THE HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST
JUSTICES, JUDGES, AND MAGISTRATES III(c)(9), in 1A W. VA. CODE at 19 (Supp.
1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.93(3) (West 1983).
'71 See Commissions Fine Tune Rules on Confidentiality, Informal Resolutions,
supra note 169, at 1.
172 Efforts to extend the holding of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596 (1982), to contexts beyond the criminal trial will no doubt concern those who
fear transformation of the first amendment into a governmental "sunshine act." See,
e.g., Goodale, Gannett is Burned by Richmond's First Amendment "Sunshine Act,"
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 29, 1980, at 24, col. 2. However, there are limiting principles that
would restrict extension of the right of access recognized by Globe.
First, the functional role of access was the controlling factor in the Supreme
Court's recognition in Globe of a right of access to criminal trials. See supra text ac-
companying notes 128-40. The Court favored access because it enhanced the integrity
of the factfinding process, assured the appearance of justice, and promoted effective
citizen self-government. Id. To the extent that any of these three interests would not be
furthered by extension of access to the legislative or executive realms, the functional
role rationale would presumably not support such extension.
A second principle that would affect extension of access rights to the legislative
and- executive branches is the separation of powers doctrine.
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general
departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influ-
ence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and
is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in the very fact of
the separation of the powers of these departments by the Constitution; and
in the rule which recognizes their essential co-equality. The sound appli-
cation of a principle that makes one master in his own house precludes
him from imposing his control in the house of another who is master
there.
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
While the separation of powers doctrine does not allow the three branches to oper-
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ate with absolute independence, see, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54
(1982), it does act as a constraint on the power bf any one branch to invade the domain
of either of the other two. Id. at 756. A judicially mandated right of public access to
legislative or executive proceedings would face this barrier, one not encountered by
recognition of a right of access-to criminal trials or by extension of that right to judicial
disciplinary proceedings.
A third limiting principle is derived from the nature of the right recognized in
Globe-it is not absolute, but may be overridden if denial of access is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Globe, 457
U.S. at 606. Though the Court has not specified' what interests would meet this stan-
dard, see id. at 607, substantial national- security, foreign affairs, or other similar con-
cerns would probably be sufficient. See id. at 607 n.17. To the extent these interests are
implicated with greater frequency in legislative and executive proceedings, they could
override any right of access held applicable to those proceedings more often than, they
might override rights of access to judicial proceedings.
